Authority,
Fact & Value
There
are two misconceptions that obscure the roots of controversy
in many fields. These are:
1)
that facts are independent of human judgments;
2)
that evaluation is necessarily an expression of personal values.
Many
people
think of facts as some kind of little stones, “hard data” they are
sometimes called. Being stone-like there is no question that they are
"really there." All we have to do is find them and pick them up.
“Knowledge of fact,” from this point of view, possesses a “hard
objectivity." Facts are what’s real.
This
image of facts does not help us understand the variety and depth of
controversy that exists in the world. When a controversy arises,
either side takes itself to be dealing in hard, stony fact and rushes
to the conclusion that their opponents can't tell a stone from a
shadow; so stupid or perverse are they. But can argument
settle such disagreements?
To
analyze controversy, we must understand that what people understand to
be facts depends on the conditions of authority, community, and
intelligent evidential use.
Facts
bearing on a dispute are determined by:
•
(AUTHORITY) - What the appropriate authorities
•
(COMMUNITY) - recognized in a given community
•
(EVIDENTIAL USAGE) -admit as evidence.
This
definition
of fact opens up a way to understand persistent disputes and recognize
how deeply they may be rooted.
Some
religious communities take sickness to be a visitation from an evil
spirit or the withdrawal of God’s grace. Aren't they mistaken?
Aren’t those who understand sickness to be the result of a
bacterium or virus really
in possession of the facts? Don't they prove
their superior grasp of fact by curing the illness with a serum?
An
authority
from one of these religious communities might offer a different
interpretation. The serum is a“tool of Grace” by which the evil spirit
is driven out. And those bacteria -- which they can see under a
microscope just as well as we can -- are a physical manifestation of
the demon causing the illness.
It
is
important to realize that so long as it is important to this religious
community to see changes in the world as the interaction of spirits,
and so long as they can translate without too much practical
disadvantage what we say in our language into theirs, there can be no
argument which will definitively demonstrate that our “scientific”
conception of fact is better than theirs.
But,
if
they begin to die off, won’t that clinch our argument? Won’t the
desire for pure survival shift their conceptions of authority, and
consequently of fact? Maybe, but only if they value physical survival
above maintaining the belief system of their community.
The
characterization
of fact as dependent on the authority of a community also helps us
understand a common controversy in America. Many think that the
evidential rules used in criminal cases are an affront to common
sense. Consider a court room in which a judge does not admit as trial
evidence a murder weapon seized by police in an illegal search. To
“common sense” -- the community untrained in the practice of Law --
the weapon is a hard fact. In the courtroom, for the purposes of this
particular trial, it does not exist. This again shows how authority
can determine the nature of fact.
Thinking
of fact as relative to specific communities and the authorities they
recognize makes many of us uncomfortable. It appears too
relativistic. After all, there are many kinds of authority
recognized across diverse communities. And trying to define just what
a community is, is problematic. Can’t we rely on plain old sense
experience: what we see, feel, hear, smell and taste?
Do we argue about the existence of water?
Yes,
but…
Cross your middle finger over you index finger (either hand will do).
Close your eyes. Touch the tip of your nose. You will feel two
nose-tips. But you don’t have two noses. When you see pools of water
on a hot summer highway, you know what you see isn’t real.
And the room that feels warm to a person coming out of the cold can
feel chilly to a person who has been sitting quietly in it.
What
we
rely on to judge some of our perceptions as illusory is a kind of
“theory”. The exact nature of this theory is still a controversial
issue among philosophers and scientists. What is clear is that
illusions do not come labeled as such: it requires an exercise in
judgment to distinguish them from “factual” perceptions.
The possibility of illusion or misperception shows one thing. Perception alone does not provide us with the “hard facts” we might hope to use to convert “primitively” thinking people to our scientific point of view. They might convert as they try to reconcile their beliefs to the life they are faced with living; but arguments alone can’t do that. They can’t because the authorities we recognize and the authorities they recognize may not be the same.
a.
Do the disputants consider themselves to be members of the same
general community?
When
parties to a dispute are very polarized, they tend to demonize each
other. Argument is useless if both sides are firm in their insistence
of no compromise.
b.
Do they recognize the same authorities as appropriate sources of
fact?
If
no common authority can be found for deep agreement, can the parties
to the dispute agree to live together? Or are they pushing to convert
or even exterminate the opposition?
c.
Can either party to the dispute state what would count as evidence against
their own position? Would the opposite side accept such evidence?
If
the answer to both questions is yes, than there is hope for
reconciliation. If the answer is no, there is no specific point to
argument. (But see Functions
of Conflict)
These
criteria
are harder to use than may be apparent at first glance. We each belong
to many communities. Our membership in a particular community is often
determined by the authorities we are willing to recognize as well as
the interests we share. Communities themselves may be conceived of as
broader or narrower depending on the issues under dispute. For
example, Americans tend to agree on general issues despite
disagreement on specific ones, i.e. the right to vote vs. the right to
choose an abortion. Being a Democrat or Republican does not determine
whether one is Pro-Life or Pro-Choice.
Despite
the
problems in using it, this first step focusses our attention on what
might be some important sources of persistent controversy.
If
someone says, “This is a very fine gun,” does it mean she likes
the gun? Couldn’t a pacifist know and apply the standards necessary to
distinguish between a well and badly made weapon? Similarly, are
police officers to enforce a law only if they agree with it?
It
is a very common mistake to think that because a person applies
standards, that person is in favor of those standards. People who
confuse this issue are likely to confuse as well the difference
between criticism and dislike, as though liking something made one
incapable of seeing its disadvantages.
These
are simple misconceptions, yet so very common as to merit special
attention. Most anyone could understand it if someone said:
1.
This
isn’t very good beer; but I like it.
2.
He’s
a good ball player; but I hate his guts.
3.
The
choice cuts of meat I find too fatty for my taste.
4.
The candidate is unappealing; but I’ll vote for him, nonetheless.
5.
The best hunting is found in Canada. But, personally, I am not at all
interested in hunting.
A
simple procedure avoids confusing evaluation with commitment when
analyzing disputes.
b.
they are using some standard to support their evaluation.
Many
people hedge their judgments by beginning with, “I feel that…” so as
to not offend their listener, if he or she disagrees. This maneuver
also dodges the question of standards. But if it is important, we can
push the question of standards and ask the evaluator if he or she
agrees or disagrees with the standards as they are normally used
Three
common misconceptions about value were discussed:
•
I: the first mistake is the idea that “hard fact” will come to the
rescue to settle disputes. But what a fact is, depends upon what
authorities we acknowledge to determine what is a fact.
• II: the second mistake is believing criticism to be an expression of dislike; or the use of standards of criticism to indicate a commitment to those standards. But vegetarians can learn to grade steaks.
One
reason the characterization, “hard,” seems so appropriate for facts is
that the way we conceive of facts is in opposition to such “soft”
things as wishes, hopes, feelings, and beliefs.
Let’s
consider what is recognized by people in most, if not all, cultures of
this globe to be a fact: beheading is fatal to humans. We do not
consider any facts about human wishes, hopes and feelings to affect
the fact of what they wish, hope for or feel. Consider the following
list:
1.
John
feels that beheading is not fatal to humans.
2.
Sam
hopes that beheading is not fatal to humans.
3.
Mary
wishes that beheading were not fatal to humans.
4.
Harry
believes that beheading is not fatal to humans.
5.
Jack
is firmly convinced that beheading is not fatal to humans.
6.
Sue
suspects that beheading is not fatal to humans.
7.
As far as Howard is concerned, beheading is not fatal to humans;
although he is willing to let us believe what we will.
Even
though
examples 1 through 7 may be true, we do not accept them as disproving
that beheading is fatal to humans.
Yet
is
seems in some cases that facts do depend on the perceptions and
beliefs of individuals, e.g. John says, “I feel a pain in my leg.” If
John is not lying, then that he feels a pain in his leg is a fact.
Does this mean that facts are not so hard and that wishes, suspicions,
etc. have some bearing on what is fact?
Considerations
in
developing an answer: Note that John would not normally say
any of the following:
1.
I
am firmly convinced that there is a pain in my leg. (What would it
take to make him doubt it? Could he be less more or less
convinced?)
2.
I
suspect that there is a pain in my leg. (If John can identify a
feeling in his leg as pain, would he merely suspect it?)
3.
I
believe there is a pain in my leg. (He might be thinking it is a
referred pain, generated somewhere else in his body.)
4.
For
me, there is a pain in my leg. (What could it mean for John to say, "
For Harry, there is a pain my (John's) leg" -- unless John were
dissembling.)